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LA VINE V. BLAINE SCHOOL DISTRICT: FEAR SILENCES
STUDENT SPEECH IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Shannon M. M0Minimee
Abstract: In La Vine v. Blaine School District, the Ninth Circuit allowed a school to expel
a student for writing a poem about a school shooting. The court held that the school did not
violate the student's First Amendment rights because the school could reasonably forecast
that the student would cause a substantial disruption or material interference with school
activities. This Note argues that the La Vine court incorrectly applied the established standards
for evaluating the constitutionality of a school's decision to expel a student. The LaVine court
also unwisely extended the Tinker doctrine to a new area of student speech. In doing so, the
court departed from U.S. Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent and failed to provide
lower courts and schools with a clear framework for evaluating student speech believed to be
a threat of violence.
Recent school shootings have changed the way that school officials
treat student expression. Teachers and principals are understandably alert
to potential warning signs that a particular student might be capable of
such violence. Many of these possible "warning signs" occur in the form
of student expression. Therefore, schools are placed in the difficult
position of maintaining school safety while also avoiding violations of
students' First Amendment rights. Courts are also faced with the
challenging task of maintaining jurisprudence that both preserves free
speech protections and allows schools to protect students adequately.
Schools and courts have struggled to evaluate what constitutional
protection should be given to student speech that could be interpreted as
a threat of violence. The U.S. Supreme Court has articulated two
doctrines under which schools can restrict student speech without
violating the First Amendment. First, the Supreme Court has determined
that "true threats" of violence are never given First Amendment
protection.! The Ninth Circuit has since developed an objective test for
determining when an expression is an unprotected "true threat."2 Second,
because students in public schools do not retain the same First
Amendment rights as adults, the Supreme Court has developed the
Tinker doctrine to determine when schools may prohibit student speech
that would otherwise be protected under the First Amendment if the
speech had occurred in a non-school setting.3
1. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705,707 (1969).
2. See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).
3. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,513 (1969).
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In LaVine v. Blaine School District,4 the Ninth Circuit recently
allowed a school to expel a student for writing a poem about a school
shooting. Although the U.S. District Court had evaluated whether the
speech was a "true threat,"5 the Ninth Circuit ignored the "true threat"
standard. Instead, the circuit court jumped straight to the Tinker doctrine
to evaluate the poem under the standard governing "otherwise protected"
speech in the public school setting.6 The Ninth Circuit held that the
Tinker doctrine permitted the school to expel the student for speech that
indicated that he might pose a safety threat.
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to apply the correct legal
standard to decide if the school could expel the student for the possibly
threatening poem and incorrectly applied its chosen standard. Part I of
this Note outlines the development of the "true threat" doctrine, which
permits the prohibition of threatening speech, regardless of the setting.
Part II outlines the development of the Tinker standard for determining if
a student's otherwise constitutionally protected speech can be prohibited
because it occurred in the public school setting. Part III outlines the facts,
procedural history, holding, and rationale of the LaVine case. Part IV
argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to perform the threshold
determination of whether the poem could be prohibited in any setting. In
doing so, the court unwisely extended the standard for prohibiting
otherwise protected speech and failed to give lower courts and schools
clear guidance in evaluating similar student speech. Finally, the court
reached the wrong conclusion by holding that the school's action did not
violate the First Amendment.
I. TRUE THREATS OF VIOLENCE ARE NEVER AFFORDED
FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that there are certain types of speech
that are never afforded First Amendment protection.8 In Watts v. United
States,9 the Court distinguished true threats of violence from speech that
4. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
5. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., No. C99-1074R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *8-9 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 24, 2000).
6. SeeLaVine, 257 F.3d at 988.
7. See id. at 990.
8. See, e.g.,Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (speech intending to incite or
produce violence and lawless action); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-83 (1964)
(defamatory speech); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957) (obscene speech).
9. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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is protected by the First Amendment.' Specifically, the Court evaluated
whether the statement "[i]f they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
want to get in my sights is L.B.J., '.. was a true threat. Examining the
context in which the statement was given and the reaction of those who
heard it, 2 the Court held that the statement was a crude method of
expressing political opposition but was not a true threat to the life of the
President.13 However, the Court failed to create a clear test for evaluating
what constitutes an unprotected true threat of violence. 4
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit clarified what constitutes a "true threat."15
In Lovell v. Poway Unified School District,6 a school counselor alleged
that a student had threatened to shoot her, 7 while the student claimed she
used "I could just shoot someone" as a figure of speech to express her
frustration.'8 The Lovell court reasoned that, because the First
Amendment does not protect threats of physical violence in any forum,' 9
it need not rely on the Tinker doctrine." In light of the violence prevalent
in schools, school officials were justified in taking student threats very
seriously" and could take action against "true threats." The objective
test for deciding whether a statement is an unprotected "true threat" is
"whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault." An alleged threat must
be considered in its entire factual context, including the surrounding
events and the reactions of the listeners.24
10. Id. at707.
11. Id. at 706.
12. Id. at 708.
13. Id. at 707.
14. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833 (8th Cir. 2001), rehearing en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23877 (8th Cir. Nov. 5, 2001). "The
Supreme Court has not established a bright-line test for distinguishing a true threat from protected
speech.".1d. at 836.
15. See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367,371-72 (9th Cir. 1996).
16. 90 F.3d 367 (9th Cir. 1996).
17. Id. at 372.
18. Id. at 368-69.
19. Id. at 371 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969)).
20. See id. at 372.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262,1265 (9th Cir. 1990)).
24. Id.
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The Lovell court applied this "true threat" test to the counselor's
version of events. The counselor alleged that the student had angrily
entered her office and told her that if she refused to provide a schedule
change, the student would shoot her.26 Because the statement was
unequivocal and specific, a reasonable person would have foreseen that
the counselor would interpret the statement as a serious expression of
intent to harm.27 Therefore, the statement constituted a "true threat."28
The counselor's subjective fear was part of the surrounding factual
context, but a mere assertion that the listener subjectively felt threatened
does not establish that the speech constituted a "true threat."29
The court explained that the "true threat" determination would have
been a closer question under the student's version of events." The
student claimed that after several frustrating hours of attempting to
change her schedule she said, "I'm so angry, I could just shoot
someone."' It was not as clear whether a reasonable person would
interpret that statement to be a serious expression of intent to do harm
because the statement did not "directly and unambiguously" threaten
physical harm.32 Therefore, a direct and unambiguous threat is necessary
before a statement can rise to the level of a true threat.
The Ninth Circuit recently applied its "true threat" test in Bauer v.
Sampson.33 While this case did not involve student speech, it further
explains what expression rises to the level of a "true threat." In Bauer, a
college disciplined a professor who had published the following arguably
threatening writings in a campus newspaper: a fantasy description of a
funeral for a college trustee and the asphyxiation of the college president;
illustrations showing the president beheading his enemies; an illustration
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 372-73.
30. Id. at 373.
31. Id. at 369.
32. Id. at 373; see also Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(recognizing that schools are in a difficult position after heavily publicized school shootings, but
holding that school failed to show any evidence that student's website was intended to actually
threaten anyone or that student manifested any violent tendencies). The student's claim in Lovell
ultimately failed because neither side could prove which statement was actually made; thus, the
student did not meet her burden of proving that the school had violated her First Amendment rights.
See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 373.
33. 261 F.3d 775 (9th Cir. 2001).
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depicting three shrunken people assembling a rifle; and an illustration of
a two-ton granite "shit list" dropping on the president's head.34 The
college argued that these writings constituted true threats.35 In addition,
the college asked the court to consider other related events involving the
professor.36 For example, the college claimed that the professor had
experienced verbal run-ins with other employees, told his supervisor that
he and the president were "going down," told a co-worker "your day has
come" after the co-worker mocked a friend, and referred to minority co-
workers as "the dark side."37 The college also submitted a report from a
psychiatrist who believed that the professor was sufficiently disturbed to
require counseling and was an increasingly ominous risk because of his
unambiguously stated fantasies of revenge and destruction.38 The court
held that despite a turbulent campus community and the other related
events involving the professor, there was "simply no way a reasonable
reader would have construed the writings and illustrations to be 'true
threats."' 39 Consequently, mere illustrations and fantasies are not direct
and unambiguous enough to amount to true threats.
In Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District," the Eighth Circuit
applied the Ninth Circuit's "true threat" analysis to a student's songs that
contained lyrics about the student wanting to rape and kill his former
girlfriend.4' The court noted that the "true threat" doctrine, and not the
Tinker doctrine, must govern the evaluation of the songs.4" The Eighth
Circuit, acknowledging that the Supreme Court had not yet established a
bright-line test for distinguishing a "true threat" from protected speech,43
applied the Ninth Circuit's "clearly articulated" standard for identifying a
34. See id. at 780.
35. See id. at 782-783.
36. Id. at 784 (noting that no allegation had been made that the professor had ever been physically
abusive or violent, on or off campus).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 788 (Gould, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
39. Id. at 784.
40. 263 F.3d 833 (Sth Cir. 2001), rehearing en bane granted, opinion vacated, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23877 (8th Cir. Nov. 5,2001). Although later vacated, this opinion is a helpful application of
the "true threat" standard to student speech involving violent imagery.
41. Id. at 835. A third party gave one of the songs to the former girlfriend at school and school
officials suspended the student for a semester for making a terroristic threat in violation of school
rules. Id. at 835-36.
42. See id. at 836. The Pulaski court determined that if the songs did not amount to true threats,
Tinker would not apply because the songs were personal expressions that occurred offcampus. Id.
43. Id.
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"true threat."'  Even though the songs included four threats to kill the
former girlfriend by lying in wait under her bed with a knife, and three
threats to rape and sodomize her,45 the court held that the songs were
protected speech.46 The former girlfriend had no knowledge of any
previous violent acts toward her or others, and the two had peacefully
interacted after the breakup.47 Therefore, under the totality of the
circumstances, a reasonable person would not foresee the songs to be a
serious expression of intent to harm her, but merely as the student's
artistic expression of anger and sadness over the breakup. Consequently,
even explicitly threatening speech does not amount to a "true threat"
without a reasonable estimation that the words carry a true intent to
harm.
48
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's "true threat" test requires a court to
determine whether a reasonable person would foresee that the listener
would interpret the speech as a serious expression of intent to cause
harm.49 In evaluating student speech in schools, if a court finds a
student's statement to be a "true threat" of violence, that speech is
deemed unprotected and the court need not perform any additional
analysis.5" However, if student speech does not amount to a "true threat,"
the Tinker doctrine may still allow the school to prohibit the speech
because of the special nature of public schools."
44. Id. at 837.
45. Id. at 839 (Hansen, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at 837.
47. Id. at 837-38.
48. See id at 838; see also D.G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 of Tulsa County, No. 00-C-0614-E,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12197, at *12-16 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (applying the Ninth Circuit
"true threat" test, and holding that student poem expressing hatred of class and expressing yearning
to kill her teacher was not serious expression of intent to cause harm, but rather private way for
student to address her feelings of frustration and anger); Boman v. Bluestem Unified Sch. Dist., No.
00-1034-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389, at *10-12. (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (holding that
student's poster was not a threat, because it was not reasonable to accept that display of unsigned
poster would be taken as threat by other students).
49. Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996).
50. See id. at 371.
51. See infra Part II.
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I. COURTS HAVE ALLOWED SUPPRESSION OF CERTAIN
OTHERWISE PROTECTED SPEECH IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOL SETTING
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,5 2 the
U.S. Supreme Court announced that students in public schools retain
First Amendment rights, but that those rights are necessarily limited by
the special nature of the public school environment.53 The Tinker Court
set forth the general standard for determining when a school can
permissibly restrict student speech that would be "otherwise protected"
in any other setting. 4 If the speech at issue would be protected outside of
the school setting, the Tinker doctrine applies."5 The Court has since
recognized two exceptions to the Tinker standard giving schools
discretion to restrict vulgar 6 and school-sponsored speech.57 Lower
courts further developed the Tinker doctrine by answering some
questions remaining after these cases.
A. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Created Special Standards for
Restricting Otherwise Protected Student Speech in Public Schools
In 1969, during the height of the Vietnam War, three students
questioned the constitutionality of a school policy that prohibited them
from wearing armbands to protest the war.58 The students violated the
policy, were suspended from school, and filed an action against the
school district for violating their First Amendment rights.59 In Tinker, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that students are persons under the Constitution
and that they possess fundamental rights that public schools must
respect.6" Therefore, a school may suppress student expression that
would otherwise be protected outside of school only if the expression
would "materially and substantially" interfere "with the requirements of
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
53. See id. at 506.
54. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 527-29 (9th Cir. 1992).
55. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06 (discussing otherwise protected nature of the armbands);
Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371.
56. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
57. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988).
58. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 511.
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appropriate discipline in the operation of the school" or "collid[e] with
the rights of others."'"
Applying this new test to the Tinker facts, the Court determined that
the armbands did not interrupt school activities or collide with the rights
of other students.62 While the armbands caused discussion outside of the
classroom, no interference with classes or schoolwork occurred,6 3 nor
was there disorder on the school premises.' The Court recognized other
students' rights "to be secure and let alone," but held that the armbands
did not violate those rights.6"
The Tinker Court announced that schools do not have to wait until a
disturbance occurs to take action to prevent that disturbance.66 School
officials may prevent student speech if they are aware of facts that
produce a reasonable forecast of material or substantial disruption.67 A
reasonable forecast requires "more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint";68 undifferentiated fear of disturbance alone is not enough.69
Therefore, a school can only restrict otherwise protected speech that has
not yet caused a disturbance if it can reasonably forecast that the speech
will cause a material or substantial disruption.70
61. Id. at 513. The Tinker court took its rule from two Fifth Circuit cases. See Blackwell v.
Issaquena Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749, 754 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding regulation banning "freedom
buttons" because the buttons undermined authority, caused an unusual degree of commotion, a lack
of order, decorum, and discipline, and collided with the rights of other students who were harassed
and forced to wear the buttons); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748-49 (5th Cir. 1966) (finding
similar ban unconstitutional because there was only a mild curiosity but no disruption or
interference).
62. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
63. Id. But cf Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 754.
64. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 514.
65. Id. at 509.
66. Id. at 509, 514.
67. Id. Schools may create policies banning speech that would cause material and substantial
disruption or collide with the rights of other students. See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist.,
240 F.3d 200, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2001). Such policies must not be vague or overbroad in defining what
speech is prohibited. See id. at 214-15. These policies are evaluated by determining whether the
prohibited speech is within one of the categories that Tinker and its progeny authorize schools to
prevent. See id. at 211-14. Where a student is punished for disobeying a policy, courts often evaluate
the application of the policy to a particular student as well as a facial challenge to the
constitutionality of the policy itself under Tinker and its progeny. See, eg., West v. Derby Unified
Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1365, 1367 (10th Cir. 2000).
68. Tinker, 393 U.S at 509.
69. Id. at 508.
70. Id. at 514.
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Twenty-seven years passed before the U.S. Supreme Court revisited
the evaluation of otherwise protected student speech in public schools. In
Bethel School District v. Fraser,7 the Court created the first exception to
the Tinker doctrine, holding that public schools, in fulfilling their
responsibility to instill the habits and manners of civility, have the
authority to prohibit student speech that is vulgar or lewd without a
showing of material disruption.72 The Court reasoned that, even though
lewd or vulgar speech is protected outside public schools, such speech
would undermine the school's basic educational mission.73 In Fraser, the
Court focused on the nature of the speech itself and the potential effect
the speech might have on those who heard it.74
Two years later in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,75 the U.S.
Supreme Court created a second exception to the Tinker standard.76 The
Court held that schools can exercise editorial control over the style and
content of otherwise protected student speech in school-sponsored
expressive activities, such as school newspapers, so long as the schools'
censorship is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.7 7
Again the Court focused on the speech itself and the potential effect that
the speech might have, reasoning that schools must be able to control
forums that the public might perceive as bearing the imprimatur of the
school.78 Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood constitute the extent of the U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence governing otherwise protected speech in
the public school setting.
B. Circuit Courts Have Further Developed the Tinker Doctrine
Lower courts have since interpreted how these three U.S. Supreme
Court decisions interrelate. In Chandler v. McMinnville School District,79
the Ninth Circuit explained that there are three distinct areas of speech in
which public school students retain less First Amendment protection than
71. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
72- Id. at 681; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 n.4 (1988)
(explaining that the Fraser decision was based on the vulgar character of the speech rather than the
Tinker standard of the speech causing material disruption).
73. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
74. See id. at 684.
75. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
76. See id. at 270 ("It is this standard, rather than our decision in Tinker, that governs this case.").
77. Id. at 273.
78. Id. at 271-72.
79. 978 F.2d 524 (1992).
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adults.8" Vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive speech is governed
by Fraser,8 speech that occurs in a school-sponsored setting is governed
by Hazelwood,82 and otherwise protected speech that does not fall into
the previous two categories is governed by Tinker.83
In Chandler, students were suspended for wearing buttons with the
word "scab" in support of striking teachers.84 Finding that the buttons
were neither obscene nor school-sponsored,85 the court asked if wearing
the buttons would "substantially disrupt, or materially interfere with,
school activities. '86 Because the buttons were not actually disruptive, did
not inherently distract students, and did not break down the
regimentation of the classroom, the expression was protected under
Tinker.87 Thus, the Chandler court clarified how the decisions from
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood apply to otherwise protected student
speech while applying the entire doctrine to the facts of the case.88
Because the U.S. Supreme Court has yet to evaluate the suppression
of student speech based on a forecast of disruption, lower courts have
been forced to define what types of events will support a reasonable
forecast of disruption.89 In Karp v. Becken,9" the Ninth Circuit considered
the reasonableness of a school's forecast that signs advocating a student
walkout from a scheduled assembly would cause disruption.9' In
response to advocacy for the walkout, opposing students had threatened
to stop the walkout, and the assembly was cancelled out of fear of
violence.92 Some students actually walked out of classes to protest, and
someone pulled a fire alarm.93 The media was alerted to the planned
walkout,94 resulting in the disruption of the adjacent junior high school's
80. Id. at 529.
81. Id. (concluding that, even though the student speech in Fraser had occurred in an assembly,
school could prohibit such speech regardless of where in the school the speech took place).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 526.
85. Id. at 530.
86. Id. (omitting consideration of potential invasion of other students' rights included in Tinker).
87. Id. at 531 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966)).
88. Id. at 530.
89. See, e.g., Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973).
90. 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973).
91. See id. at 173, 175-77.
92. Id. at 175.
93. Id.
94. Id.
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lunch schedule." When evaluating the school officials' confiscation of
the signs, the Karp court focused on the signs' potential effect, and held
that it was reasonable for the school to fear that the signs themselves
would provoke a possibly violent incident.96
In Burch v. Baker,97 the Ninth Circuit evaluated a school's decision to
place letters of reprimand in the files of students who distributed an
underground newspaper at a class barbeque.9" The Ninth Circuit
cautioned that courts must only look to "concrete evidence"99 of actual or
potential disruption resulting from specific student expression,' and that
a school's forecast must not be based only on an "undifferentiated
fear.' 0. 1 The only evidence that the school could offer to support its
forecast was that a similar publication within the school district had
harmed a student and that similar publications in other districts had
caused disruption in some classes."' These facts were not enough to
support a reasonable forecast that the underground newspaper would
cause a material disruption at the school in question.0 3
Two recent decisions in other circuits have helped to clarify what
factors support a reasonable forecast of disruption. In West v. Derby
Unified School District,"'° the Tenth Circuit held that a reasonable
forecast of disruption could be based on recent past disruptions resulting
from similar speech.0 5 In West, racially-motivated altercations over
displays of the Confederate flag had occurred in the school district three
95. Id. at 176.
96. See id.
97. 861 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1988).
98. Id. at 1150-51.
99. Id. at 1153; see also Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist, 978 F.3d 524, 531 (1992) (reasoning
that the word "scab" by itself could not support reasonable forecast of disruption but evidence that it
was insult directed at replacement teachers may have supported reasonable forecast).
100. Id. at 1153.
101. Id. at 1154. The Supreme Court in inker reasoned that any word spoken on a school campus
that deviates from the views of another may cause a disturbance, but the Constitution requires
schools to risk disturbance when the only evidence to support the forecast of disruption is the desire
to avoid discomfort or unpleasantness. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508-09 (1969); see also Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. wash.
2000) (finding that expulsion of student based on his web page, which included mock obituaries and
a poll to determine who would "die" next, was based on undifferentiated fears of possible
disturbances or embarrassment to school officials).
102. See Burch, 861 F.2d at 1152.
103. See id. at 1153-54.
104. 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000).
105. Id. at 1366.
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years earlier."°6 These altercations adequately supported the forecast that
disruption would result from a middle school student's drawing of a
Confederate flag during class. 0 7 However, in Castorina v. Madison
County School Board,' the Sixth Circuit held that without evidence of
recent past disruptive altercations resulting from the same type of speech
within the school district, students could not be suspended for wearing
Confederate flag tee shirts." 9
Thus, once a court finds that student speech would be otherwise
protected by the First Amendment in non-school settings, it must
determine if the speech falls into one of the three categories allowing
restriction because of the unique public school setting."0 If the speech is
vulgar, lewd, obscene, or plainly offensive, it may be suppressed under
Fraser because it presumably undermines the basic educational mission
of the school."' If the speech is presented in a school-sponsored forum, it
is governed by Hazelwood and the school may suppress the speech
because it bears the imprimatur of the school."' If the speech does not
fall into the other two categories, it is protected in the public school
setting under Tinker unless a material or substantial disruption actually
results from the speech or the school can reasonably forecast that the
speech will cause a material or substantial disruption."'
III. NINTH CIRCUIT COURTS EVALUATED THE FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION GIVEN TO A STUDENT POEM
CONTAINING VIOLENT IMAGERY IN LA VNE V BLAINE
SCHOOL DISTRICT
In the aftermath of several highly publicized instances of school
violence, school officials have been quicker to restrict potentially
106. Past events included verbal confrontations between black and white students, "KKK" and
"Die Nigger" graffiti written in the school, racial incidents on school buses and at football games,
incidents at the middle school resulting from students drawing the Confederate flag on their
notebooks and on themselves, and at least one fight as a result of a student wearing a Confederate
flag headband. See id. at 1362.
107. Id. at 1366.
108. 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
109. See id. at 544.
110. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992).
111. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986).
112. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988).
113. See Chandler, 978 F.2d at 529.
Vol. 77:545, 2002
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threatening speech." 4 As a result, courts more frequently have been
forced to evaluate whether the First Amendment protects student speech
that may portend future violence and to evaluate school policies that ban
wider categories of student speech." 5 In LaVine v. Blaine School
District,1 6 the Ninth Circuit first evaluated whether student speech that
may signal future violence is protected under the First Amendment.
In the fall of 1998, James LaVine, an eleventh grade student at Blaine
High School, asked his English teacher, Vivian Bleeker, to read and give
feedback on a poem that he had written.17 The poem was not an
assignment for class,"' but Bleeker had invited students to submit
personal writings for her review earlier in the year. 9 James gave the
poem to Bleeker after class, 2° but she did not read the poem until later in
the evening at her home. 2'
Bleeker became concerned for James's well-being after reading "Last
Words,"' 22 a first-person narrative poem about a student who had shot
twenty-eight of his classmates and returned to the school two years later
to commit suicide."2 While Bleeker was not concerned for her own
114. See Linda Hils, Chalk Talk- "'Zero Tolerance" for Free Speech, 30 J.L. & EDuc. 365, 365
(2001).
115. Id.
116. 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en bane denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
117. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., No. C99-1074R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 24, 2000), rev'd in part by 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
118. Id.
119. See Appellee's Reply Brief at 4, Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist, 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001)
(No. 00-35303).
120. La Vine, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *2.
121. Id. at *3.
122. Id.
123. Thepoemreads:
As each day passed, I watched, love sprout, from the most, unlikely places, wich reminds, me
that, beauty is in the eye's, of the beholder. As I remember, I start to cry, for I, had leared, this
to late, and now, I must spend, each day, alone, alone for supper, alone at night, alone at death.
Death I feel, crawling down, my neck at, every tom, and so, now I know, what I must do. I
pulled my gun, from its case, and began to load it. I remember, thinking at least I won't, go
alone, as I, jumpped in, the car, all I could think about, was I would not, go alone. As I walked,
through the, now empty halls, I could feel, my hart pounding. As I approached, the classroom
door, I drew my gun and, threw open the door, Bang, Bang, Bang-Bang. When it all was over,
28 were, dead, and all I remember, was not felling, any remorce, for I felt, I was clensing my
soul, I quickly, turned and ran, as the bell rang, all I could here, were screams, screams of
friends, screams of co workers, and just plain, screams of shear horror, as the students, found
their, slayen classmares, 2 years have passed, and now I lay, 29 roses, down upon, these stairs,
as now, I feel, I may, strike again. No tears, shall be shead, in sarrow, for I am, alone, and now, I
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safety, she was concerned about James. 124 She called the school
counselor, who in turn contacted the school's Vice Principal in charge of
discipline.125 After reviewing the poem, the school administration
contacted the Blaine Police. 126 Eventually, eight Whatcom County
Sheriffs Deputies and a canine unit visited the LaVine farm to review
the poem and interview James. 27 James told the deputies that he had no
intention of carrying out the events depicted in the poem and James's
mother assured the deputies that he had no access to weapons and was
not a danger to himself or others.2 8 The deputies contacted a licensed
psychologist with the Department of Mental Health,129 who determined
that there was not a sufficient basis to involuntarily commit James
because he did not present an imminent danger of causing harm to
himself or others. 3 ' The deputies left, finding that there was no need for
further action.'
Despite the opinions of the psychologist and the Sheriffs Office, the
school decided that the situation was grave enough to immediately expel
James.3 2 After missing seventeen days of school, James was permitted to
return only after a psychiatrist evaluated his mental state and determined
that he was fit to return to school.'33 James finished the year without
incident.3 4 The LaVine family appealed the expulsion to the Blaine
School Board, which affirmed the principal's decision to expel James. 5
hope, I can feel, remorce, for what I did, without a shed, of tears, for no tear, shall fall, from
your face, but from mine, as I try, to rest in peace, Bang!
La Vine, 257 F.3d at 983-84 (emphasis and errors in original).
124. See La Vine, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *10.
125. Id. at *3.
126. Id.
127. See Lisa Stiffler, Violent Poem Not A Threat, Judge Says; Student at Blaine High Gets His
Record Cleared, SEATTLE POST-NTELLIGENCER, Feb. 26, 2000, at B1.
128. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
129. See LaVine, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *3.
130. See id.; LaVine, 257 F.3d at 990.
131. See LaVine, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *4.
132. Id. The Washington Administrative Code (WAC) allows an emergency expulsion where
there is a good and sufficient reason to believe that the student's presence poses an immediate and
continuing danger to the student, other students, or staff, or that there is an immediate and continuing
threat of substantial disruption of the educational process. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 180-40-295
(2001).
133. La Vine, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *5.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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However, the board created a new, backdated letter explaining that the
expulsion was not based on disciplinary concerns, but was instead based
on safety concerns. 36 The LaVines then brought suit in U.S. District
Court alleging that expelling James for his poem infringed on his First
Amendment rights.'37 The LaVines sought damages and an injunction
requiring removal of any negative documentation of the event from
James's school records.
A. The Federal District Court Held That La Vine's Expulsion Was
Unconstitutional Because His Poem Was Protected Speech Under
the "True Threat"Analysis
Federal District Judge Barbara Rothstein heard the challenge to James
LaVine's expulsion in LaVine v. Blaine School District.139 The school
district argued that the restriction on James's speech was justified,
because "Last Words" was not entitled to First Amendment protection as
it constituted a threat of physical violence and a disruption of the safe
operation of the school.'4 ° The LaVines maintained that the poem was
not a threat of any kind.' The parties did not dispute that the expulsion
was motivated solely by the message of "Last Words," not by the context
in which the poem was delivered, and that the school had a compelling
interest in ensuring the safety of Blaine High School. 4 '
Judge Rothstein analyzed James LaVine's poem under the "true
threat" doctrine. 43 The court held that "'Last Words' was not a sincere
expression of intent to harm or assault."1" Therefore, the court reasoned,
the poem fell squarely within the core of the First Amendment's
protection. 4 The court relied on the factual circumstances in which
James gave the poem to his teacher."4 He turned in the poem with other
school work and mentioned he had written a poem and would appreciate
136. Id.
137. Id. at *5-6.
138. Id. at *6.
139. No. C99-1074R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24,2000), rev'd inpart by
257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
140. Id. at *7.
141. Id.
142. Id at *8.
143. Id. at *10.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See id.
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Bleeker's commentary. 47 He did so without manifesting any overt
action, violent demeanor, or other threatening behavior.'48 Bleeker was
never concerned for her own well-being.'49 Furthermore, the county
sheriff and mental health professional found no evidence of a threat or
need for action.5 ° All of these factors supported the conclusion that the
poem was not a "true threat."'
' 5 1
Judge Rothstein rejected the school's consideration of the following
concerns regarding James's personal life: James had filed a domestic
violence complaint against his father, James had expressed suicidal
ideation two years earlier, he was involved in a fight at school the
previous year, and another parent had expressed concerns about his
behavior.' The court held that none of these factors led to a reasonable
conclusion that the poem was a threat and none was worthy of expelling
James. ' Finally, administrators admitted that regardless of these factors,
they would have expelled any student who wrote the poem. 54 Judge
Rothstein held that the content of "Last Words"--the admitted true basis
for the school's action-did not constitute a true threat because it was not
a serious expression of an intent to cause physical harm.i5'
B. The Ninth Circuit Held That Under Tinker's Reasonable Forecast
of Disruption Test, La Vine's Expulsion Did Not Violate the First
Amendment
The Ninth Circuit took a different approach to the case by
immediately focusing on the rare, but well-publicized, school shootings
at Columbine and other high schools.'56 The court noted that the poem
was written around the time of a shooting in "nearby" Springfield,
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at*11.
151. See id. at*10-11.
152. Id. at *11.
153. See id.
154. Id.
155. Id. The court also rejected the school's argument that it bad a right and duty under the WAC
to expel James. Id. at *14. Because the two enumerated grounds for expulsion under the WAC were
substantially equivalent to the requisite First Amendment jurisprudence, and because the court had
found the poem to be protected speech, reliance on the WAC could not vindicate the school's
decision. Id.
156. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Oregon.'57 Further, James's mother had read his poem and warned him
that his teachers at school might overreact because of the news
coverage. 5 Only after this discussion did the court reveal its holding that
the school had acted with sufficient justification and within constitutional
limits in expelling James, not because of the content of his poem, but
because of the need "to avert perceived harm."' 59
Despite the court's emphasis on safety concerns and its
characterization of the poem as an implied threat, the Ninth Circuit
evaluated the poem under the Tinker standard, instead of the "true threat"
doctrine. 60 Under the categories of student speech developed by Fraser,
Hazelwood, and Tinker, the La Vine court determined that the poem was
"all other" otherwise protected speech, governed by the Tinker test.""
Thus, the school had to show factors that might have reasonably led
school officials to forecast substantial disruption or material interference
with school activities. 62 The LaVine court reasoned that, under Karp v.
Becken,'63 schools do not have to wait until disruption occurs, but can
base a reasonable forecast of disruption on the existing facts."
The court examined the totality of the circumstances, including
James's actions and all facts confronting school officials that might have
reasonably signaled disruption.' 5 The court concluded that recent events
in James's personal life and the recent shooting in Springfield were
relevant factors under Tinker.'66 Given these facts, the school did not
violate the First Amendment by expelling James because the content of
the poem, within the "backdrop of actual school shootings," meant that,
at best, "Last Words" was a cry for help from a troubled teenager.'67
157. Id. at 984. Roughly six months had passed between the Springfield shooting and James's
submission of "Last Words." Springfield, Oregon is approximately 400 miles south of Blaine,
Washington. See RAND MCNALLY & CO., ROAD ATLAS: UNITED STATES, CANADA, MEXIco A6, 84,
108 (2000).
158. See id.
159. Id. at 983.
160. See id. at 989 n.5.
161. Id. at 988.
162. Id. at 989.
163. 477 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1973).
164. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989. The actual language in Karp more closely follows the language of
Tinker. "Tinker does not demand a certainty that disruption will occur, but rather the existence of
facts which might reasonably lead school officials to forecast a substantial disruption.' Karp, 477
F.2d at 175.
165. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989.
166. Id. at 990.
167. Id.
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Taken with the facts about James's personal life, the LaVine court
reasoned that the poem sufficiently supported a reasonable forecast of
substantial disruption or material interference with school activities,
"specifically that James [intended] to inflict injury upon himself or
others."'68 The opinions of the county sheriff and the psychologist that
James was not a threat to himself or to others did not impact the Ninth
Circuit's view of the reasonableness of the forecast because Tinker does
not require a student to meet the standards for involuntary commitment
for there to be a potential for substantial disruption.69
Therefore, even though the content of the poem was a factor, the
Ninth Circuit focused on the potential action that the school feared James
might take; 7' the school was not trying to discipline James for his
speech, but was trying to protect students from potential violence. 7'
Under this framework, the court held that the expulsion did not violate
the First Amendment because the school's forecast of disruption was
reasonable given the events that had occurred in James's life, the
backdrop of actual school shootings, and the imagery in the poem. The
La Vine court never expressly held that the poem itself was not protected
under Tinker but reasoned that "even if the poem was protected speech,
the school's actions were justified."'72 However, the court determined
that once the "perceived threat" had subsided and James was allowed to
return to school, the school's justification for maintaining the
documentation for safety concerns was no longer valid. 7
168. Id.
169. Id. The standard for involuntary commitment of a minor in Washington is that the minor is
suffering from a mental disorder and presents a likelihood of serious harm. WASH. REV. CODE §
71.34.050. While a determination that James's behavior did not pose a threat of serious harm
warranting involuntary commitment alone does not mean that "Last Words" was not a "true threat,"
the psychologist's opinion as to the threat James posed was a surrounding circumstance that the
school could consider under the "true threat" doctrine
170. Id. at 991.
171. Id.; see also id. at 991 n.9 (emphasizing that the school was acting out of safety, and not
disciplinary concerns).
172. Id. at 989 n.5.
173. Id. at 992. The Ninth Circuit has since rejected the LaVines' petition for rehearing, and has
rejected a suggestion for rehearing en bane. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719, 720 (9th
Cir. 2002).
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IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DEPARTED FROM THE ESTABLISHED
STANDARDS GOVERNING STUDENT SPEECH
RESTRICTIONS IN LA VINE V. BLAINE SCHOOL DISTRICT
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Tinker standard in La Vine was a
drastic departure from its previous student speech jurisprudence because
it ignored both the "true threat" doctrine and Tinker's limited application
to otherwise protected speech. 74 Prior to LaVine, the Ninth Circuit had
developed what the Eight Circuit described as the "most clearly
articulated and concise standard for identifying a 'true threat.""' 75
Furthermore, in Chandler, the Ninth Circuit had clearly listed what types
of "otherwise protected" speech could be suppressed in the unique public
school setting.'76 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit had an opportunity in
LaVine to clearly indicate both how courts should evaluate student
speech that may be a potential threat of violence and how the "true
threat" doctrine and the Tinker doctrine should relate. Instead, the court
confused the application of both doctrines.
The LaVine court should have determined whether the poem would be
constitutionally protected in a non-public school setting by applying the
"true threat" test. Under the "true threat" doctrine, the court should have
concluded that James's poem was protected speech.'77 Only after
deciding that the poem would be constitutionally protected in a non-
public school setting should the LaVine court have turned to the Tinker
doctrine for evaluating otherwise protected speech delivered in public
schools.'78 Then the court should have evaluated the reasonableness of
the school's forecast of disruption. The LaVine court also should have
limited this analysis to an evaluation of the potential effects of the speech
itself. 79 While the LaVine court may have attempted to create a new
exception to the Tinker doctrine, this potential exception is not consistent
with the existing Tinker exceptions. 8 ' Thus, under first a "true threat"
analysis, and then under a Tinker analysis, the Ninth Circuit should have
concluded that James LaVine's poem was protected speech.
174. See infra Part W.A.2.
175. Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist, 263 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2001), rehearing en
banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 01-1048, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23877 (8th Cir. Nov. 5,2001).
176. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524,529 (9th Cir. 1992).
177. See infra Part IV.A.3.
178. See infra Part V.A.1.
179. See infra Part W.B.1.
180. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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A. The Ninth Circuit Should Have Applied the "True Threat" Test
Instead of the Tinker Doctrine When Evaluating the
Constitutionality of "Last Words"
The Laine court should have first applied the "true threat" test to
determine if the poem would be protected in any setting, before applying
the Tinker test.18' In this context, the court could properly consider
personal life factors. 82 Even so, under a proper "true threat" analysis, the
district court was correct in holding that James's poem did not rise to the
level of a true threat.'83
1. The LaVine Court Should Have First Applied the "True Threat"
Test To Determine if the Speech in Question Was Protected Outside
of the School Setting
Before applying the Tinker doctrine to evaluate "otherwise protected"
student speech, the La Vine court should have applied the "true threat"
test to decide if "Last Words" was constitutionally protected in any
setting."' Had the court held that the poem was a "true threat," the poem
would not have been entitled to constitutional protection in any forum,
including public schools.'85 In LaVine, the Ninth Circuit never
determined that "Last Words" was "otherwise protected" speech. In fact,
while the District Court based its decision on the "true threat" test,1"' the
Ninth Circuit only mentioned "true threat" in a brief footnote, claiming
that the issue did not need to be resolved.
187
By sidestepping the issue of whether the poem was "otherwise
protected" speech, the LaVine court extended the application of the
Tinker doctrine beyond the bounds dictated by the U.S. Supreme
Court."'88 If the LaVine court meant this footnote to satisfy the
requirement that it must first determine that the speech was otherwise
181. See infra Part W.A.1.
182. See Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 783 (9th Cir. 2001).
183. See infra Part W.A.3.
184. See infra Part IV.A.2.
185. See infra Part W.A.2.
186. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., No. C99-1074R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *5 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 24, 2000), rev'd in part by 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
187. Lavine v. Blaine Seh. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 n.5 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
188. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Seh. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266-67 (1988).
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protected, this conclusion was at best unsupported, and at worst resulted
in a manipulation of the doctrine.'89 By glossing over the "true threat"
doctrine and Tinker's limited applicability to otherwise protected speech,
the Ninth Circuit was able to base its holding on a standard that now
gives students less First Amendment protection.
2. The "True Threat" Test Was the Appropriate Analysis for
Evaluating the School Officials'Decision To Expel James La Vine
Because They Believed He Posed a Safety Risk
As Lovell illustrates, the "true threat" doctrine evaluates the potential
action of the speaker-the chance that the speaker will follow the threat
with an act of violence. 9 ' In contrast, Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood,
when properly applied to otherwise protected expression, evaluate the
effect that the speech itself will have on the school. 9t The tests are
inherently different92 and evaluation of the threat of future violent action
is properly evaluated only under the "true threat" doctrine.
The Blaine School District did not suppress James's speech to prevent
his poem from creating a disturbance 93 or to prevent the poem from
being perceived as representing the school. 9 4 School officials were not
attempting to suppress "Last Words" out of a concern for the impact that
the poem itself would have, but were attempting to prevent James from
returning to school out of a fear that he, and not his poem, posed a
danger. 19' The Ninth Circuit characterized "Last Words" as a perceived
or implied threat.' 96 The court acknowledged that the school expelled
James to avert a perceived potential harm, not out of a concern that the
content of "Last Words" itself would lead to disruption.'97 Consequently,
189. SeeLaVine, 257 F.3d 981,989 n.5.
190. See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sc. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting that, in
light of the violence prevalent in schools today, school officials are justified in taking very seriously
student threats against faculty or other students).
191. See Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524,529 (9th Cir. 1992) (summarizing the
Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood decisions).
192. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 371 (describing the two tests and under what circumstances they
should be applied).
193. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514.
194. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,270-71 (1988).
195. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir.
2001) (No. 00-35303).
196. SeeLalVine, 257 F.3d at 983.
197. See id.
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the evaluation of James's potential for future violence is more properly
analyzed under the "true threat" doctrine.
Furthermore, under the "true threat" doctrine, the Ninth Circuit would
have been justified in looking at all of the factual circumstances,
including James's personal life, in order to evaluate whether "Last
Words" constituted a "true threat." Under the "true threat" doctrine,
alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual
context, including the surrounding events and other alleged conduct. 9 , In
contrast, when evaluating whether a forecast of disruption is reasonable
under Tinker, courts may only look to evidence of potential disturbance
resulting from a specific student expression.'99 The factors used to
support a forecast of disruption are limited to factors used to evaluate the
potential effect of the speech itself, such as past disturbances occurring
as a result of the type of speech in question.00 Because the "true threat"
doctrine allows for the evaluation of the nature of the speaker20' through
consideration of the speech in light of its entire factual context, the Ninth
Circuit could have properly addressed all of its concerns under the "true
threat" test.
3. Under the "True Threat" Doctrine, James La Vine's Expulsion
Cannot Be Constitutionally Justified
A court can take action against student speech that is a threat of
violence or physical harm, but that speech must rise to the level of a
"true threat." 202 Even though the LaVine court emphasized the violence
generally prevalent in schools,23 under the objective "true threat" test
there must be more than a generalized fear for "Last Words" to rise to the
level of a "true threat." Instead, a reasonable person must foresee that the
statement would be interpreted by the listener as a serious expression of
198. See Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775,783 (9th Cir. 2001).
199. See infra Part IV.B.1
200. See Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd. 246 F.3d 536, 544 (6th Cir. 2001); West v. Derby
Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.3d 1358, 1366 (10th Cir. 2000).
201. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 2001), rehearing
en bancgranted, opinion vacated, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23877 (8th Cir. Nov. 5,2001) (taking into
account student's past behavior and history of violence); Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 784 (9th
Cir. 2001) (noting that there had been no allegation that professor had ever been physically abusive
or violent on or off campus).
202. See Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371-72 (9th Cir. 1996).
203. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
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intent to harm or assault. °4 A court must consider alleged threats in light
of their entire factual context, including the surrounding events and the
reaction of the listener.2 °s
Unlike the Lovell statement, "[i]f you don't give me this schedule
change, I'm going to shoot you," the language of "Last Words" is not
expression that any person could reasonably consider to be a serious
expression of intent to harm or assault.20 6 The statement found to be a
"true threat" in Lovell was a statement of future action directly aimed at
the target of the threat.20 7 "Last Words" is a past-tense narrative that does
not mention a desire to harm any specific person at Blaine High School.
The poem is even less specific and direct than the student's version of
her statement in Lovell, "I'm so angry, I could just shoot someone,"2 "
which the Lovell court reasoned may not have risen to the level of a "true
threat. ' 209 "Last Words" is also far less specific and direct than the threat
to murder and rape a particular person in the Pulaski songs, which were
not found to be true threats.210 Further, "Last Words" is less specific than
the violent writings of the college professor in Bauer that the Ninth
Circuit found not to constitute true threats, even though the author
specifically named a target and described ways in which the writer
wanted to harm that target.
21
'
In addition, the surrounding circumstances do not support a finding
that "Last Words" was a "true threat." Vivian Bleeker, unlike the
counselor in Lovell,212 was never concerned for her safety.213 The school
presented no evidence that other students, arguably the targets of the
poem, felt threatened.2 4 Unlike Bauer, where a psychiatrist advised that
204. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 372.
205. Id.
206. See id.
207. Id. at 368.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 373; see also supra note 32.
210. See Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 263 F.3d 833, 837 (8th Cir. 2001), rehearing
en banc granted, opinion vacated, No. 01-1048, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 23877 (8th Cir. Nov. 5,
2001); cf D.G. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11 of Tulsa County, No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12197, at *13-14 (N.D. Okla. 2000) (noting that poem entitled "Killing Mrs....
articulating that "the Bitch had to die!" was not a genuine threat despite its specificity).
211. See Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775,780 (9th Cir. 2001).
212. See Lovell, 90 F.3d at 373.
213. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., No. C99-1074R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *10 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 24, 2000), rev'd in part by 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
214. See id. at *3 (noting that Bleeker did not read the poem until afler she had left the school);
see also Boman v. Bluestrem Unified Sch. Dist., No. 00-1034-WEB, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5389,
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the writings were part of a pattern of escalating violence, the Blaine
school administration was advised by a psychologist that the poem was
not a sufficient basis to determine that James was a threat to himself or
others.215
The school did have a valid concern about James's state of mind, and
that concern was worthy of some school action, such as an evaluation by
the school's psychologist. However, when compared with other "true
threat" cases, "Last Words" did not rise to the level of a "true threat." A
reasonable person would find that the poem was what James claimed it to
be-a first person exploration of what a school shooter might feel two
years after an assault on other students.216
The Ninth Circuit essentially conducted a "true threat" evaluation of
the threat that James posed, under the guise of a Tinker evaluation of the
potential disruptive effect of the speech. Perhaps the court was
attempting to take advantage of Tinker's lower threshold for prohibiting
student expression while using the broader factors relevant only in a
"true threat" analysis. However, doing so in the face of previously clear
statements governing the proper application of each test merely
accentuates the LaVine court's result-oriented approach. Even worse,
such misapplication of Tinker confuses future courts and reduces
predictability for schools already facing difficult decisions in evaluating
student speech. While fear of school violence is a valid concern, the
Ninth Circuit sacrificed the benefits of predictable results and
jurisprudential clarity in order to reach a politically popular result in this
case. Had the court followed the appropriate analysis and applied the
"true threat" doctrine, the court would likely have found that James
LaVine's poem was not a true threat of violence and was instead
"otherwise protected" speech that could be restricted only if it met the
properly-applied Tinker standard.
at *11 (D. Kan. Jan. 28, 2000) (holding that student's poem was not a true threat, because it was not
reasonable to believe that other students would view an unsigned art project to be a threat against
them).
215. See supra notes 133, 169 and accompanying text..
216. Cf D.G. v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 11 of Tulsa County, No. 00-C-0614-E, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12197, at *3-4 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 21, 2000) (finding that poem expressing desire to kill
teacher was private way for student to address her feelings and not a true threat).
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B. A Holding That Tinker Justified James La Vine 's Expulsion Is
Inconsistent with Prior Applications of the Tinker Doctrine
By choosing to apply the Tinker doctrine to a situation that was not
about the effect or potential effect of a student's speech, the Ninth
Circuit applied Tinker in a way that is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court
precedent.217 The Ninth Circuit, for the first time, allowed the personal
life of the speaker, as well as sensational events in other parts of the
country, to support a forecast of disruption.28 Even if the Ninth Circuit
was attempting to create a new exception to the Tinker doctrine, this
exception cannot be reconciled with the two exceptions that the U.S.
Supreme Court has previously articulated. 9
1. The Court Improperly Focused on Events Unconnected to the Effect
of the Actual Speech in Order To Evaluate the Reasonableness of
the School's Forecast of Disruption
The LaVine court could not find that "Last Words" itself caused an
actual disruption at the school."0 No "interference with schoolwork or
discipline" resulted when James wrote the poem and brought it to
school;"' Bleeker did not even read the poem until later that evening
when she was home.' Because there was no actual disruption, the
school was required to present factors that would support a reasonable
forecast of disruption to justify James's expulsion under the Tinker
doctrine2'
The factors used to support a reasonable forecast of disruption cannot
be events unconnected with the actual speech in question. The LaVine
court cited to Karp, in which a school reasonably forecasted that protest
signs would cause disturbance, to support the proposition that a court can
consider circumstantial factors when evaluating the reasonableness of a
forecast. 4 However, the LaVine court failed to recognize that all of the
217. See infra Part V.B.2.
218. See infra Part 1V.B.1.
219. See infra Part IV.B.2.
220. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
221. Id. at511.
222. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist, No. C99-1074R, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18989, at *2-3
(W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2000), rev'd in part by 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001).
223. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509,514.
224. See Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en bane
denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
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events evaluated in Karp were directly connected to the speech itself and
its potential effects."
The events upon which the La Vine court found a reasonable forecast
of disruption included the circumstances of James's personal life226 and
school shootings that had occurred across the country. 7 These events
had nothing to do with the possible history of poetry-induced disruptions
in the Blaine School District. 8 The LaVine court never considered the
potential disruption that "Last Words" itself could cause, even when
acknowledging that, had the content of James's poem not played a role in
the decision to expel him, the court would not have to turn to First
Amendment law at all.229 Without a connection to the impact of the
speech itself, the Ninth Circuit reached beyond the previous limitations
of Tinker. Furthermore, as the Tinker case demonstrates, nationwide
turmoil alone, absent any specific link to the speech in question, fails to
support a reasonable forecast that speech about a controversial subject
will cause a material and substantial disruption." The school did not
offer any evidence that the shootings at other schools had occurred
because of speech similar to "Last Words."' Even if such a connection
did exist, the Castorina v. Madison court's holding that a forecast of
disruption based on the Confederate flag tee shirts was unreasonable
illustrates that similar disruptions must have previously occurred within
the school district making the forecast.2 2 Allowing unrelated shootings at
distant schools to justify an expulsion of a student who writes about
school shootings creates a forecast of disruption based only on
225. See Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1973).
226. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989-90.
227. See id. at 987, 990.
228. In both Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 176 (9th Cir. 1973), and West v. Derby Unified
School District, 206 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 2000), the courts looked directly at the potential
future effects of the speech when determining the reasonableness of a school's forecast of disruption.
The Karp court determined that confiscating student signs, which advocated a walkout, was not an
unreasonable forecast of disruption because of the potential that other students might be provoked by
the signs. Karp, 477 F.3d at 176. In West, the school had experienced recent disruption based on the
display of exactly the same speech then at issue. West, 206 F.3d at 1362.
229. LaVine, 257 F.3d at 991.
230. While the Vietnam War was a major source of controversy in many localities during the time
in which the school district passed the armband regulation in Tinker, that generalized fear, without
any actual disruption, was not enough to support the prohibition of the armbands. See Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 510 n.4 (1969).
231. Cf. Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that a similar underground
newspaper had harmed a student at another school in the district in the past).
232. See Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 544 (6th Cir. 2001).
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undifferentiated, unsupported fear of violence. 3 A proper forecast must
instead be based on "concrete evidence" of potential disturbance
resulting from the specific expression."
Thus, the LaVine court violated the limits of the Tinker doctrine in
two ways. First, it considered factors that did not relate to the impact of
the speech itself. Second, it gave weight to events that were too far
removed from this particular school to contribute to a reasonable
forecast. These analytical flaws amount to a holding outside of the limits
of the U.S. Supreme Court's Tinker doctrine and previous Ninth Circuit
interpretations of that doctrine.
2. The LaVine Decision Cannot Be Reconciled with Supreme Court
Case Law
The LaVine court did not expressly state that it was creating a new
exception to the Tinker doctrine. Nevertheless, because it used factors
never before considered by the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, the
LaVine court created an exception to justify its restriction of student
speech where a school is concerned that the speaker poses a safety
risk. 5 However, such an exception cannot be reconciled with the two
limited exceptions that the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Fraser and
Hazelwood.
The LaVine court did admit that under its reasoning the school could
have expelled James LaVine, regardless of whether the poem was
protected speech, 6 because the school was afraid that James would
become violent. 7 By forcing its analysis into Tinker's framework, the
La Vine court allowed schools to justify expulsions without having to link
the expulsion to the effect of a specific expression. 8 This separation
creates a new exception to the Tinker standard, allowing a school to
silence, punish, or expel students when a forecast of disruption is raised
233. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514.
234. See Burch, 861 F.2d at 1153.
235. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en bane
denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
236. See LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989 n.5.
237. See id. at 990.
238. Id. at 991; supra Part IV.B.1.
Washington Law Review
based on student characteristics rather than the potential effect of speech
itself, a result that cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedent.239
In Fraser and Hazelwood, the Supreme Court permitted schools to
suppress otherwise protected speech for very specific reasons. The
Fraser Court allowed schools to prohibit otherwise protected vulgar or
lewd speech if the speech could undermine the basic education mission
of public schools.2 14 The Hazelwood Court allowed schools to suppress
otherwise protected speech that could reasonably be interpreted to bear
the imprimatur of the school, as long as the suppression was supported
by a legitimate pedagogical concern.24' Both exceptions are limited to
speech that would otherwise be protected in non-school settings. Schools
can suppress this speech because of the effect that the speech has on the
educational mission or public perception of the school.
The LaVine court has created an exception that restricts speech
otherwise protected under Tinker, if the school can show adequate
concern that the student who delivered the speech may pose a risk of
disruption.242 Unlike the express exceptions laid out by the Supreme
Court in Frazer and Hazelwood, the exception seemingly created by the
LaVine court does not differentiate between protected and unprotected
speech. 43 Furthermore, this exception could be invoked without
determining if the speech in question would have an effect on the
school's reputation or the school's basic educational mission. The
La Vine holding is not focused on any specific type of speech, but rather
on the action that a potential speaker may take. Any exception to Tinker,
like Tinker itself, must focus on the impact that the speech itself has or
could have. Therefore, interpreting La Vine as creating a third categorical
exception to Tinker would constitute an unsupported departure from
previous U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence.
The Ninth Circuit's application of the Tinker standard in LaVine was
an unsupported departure from the Tinker doctrine. The LaVine court
incorrectly focused on the personal life of speaker and sensational events
239. One Ninth Circuit judge has interpreted the LaVine decision to create a new First
Amendment rule, allowing public schools to punish students for non-threatening speech when school
officials believe the speaker poses a risk of violence. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 279 F.3d 719,
724 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kleinfled, J., dissenting) (dissenting from court's denial of petition for rehearing
en banc).
240. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
241. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,272-73 (1988).
242. See LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 983, 990 (9th Cir. 2001), rehearing en banc
denied, 279 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 2002).
243. See id. at 989 n.5.
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in other parts of the country instead of the potential effect of the speech
itself to support a forecast of disruption. While this application of Tinker
might be read to create a new exception to the Tinker doctrine, this
exception cannot be reconciled with the exceptions created by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
V. CONCLUSION
In reaching the conclusion that James LaVine's expulsion was
justified under Tinker, the Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to give
schools and lower courts guidance on how the "true threat" and Tinker
doctrines can be used together to determine whether poems, songs, or
stories about school violence are constitutionally protected speech. A
court faced with similar speech should not follow the La Vine model, but
instead should first apply the "true threat" test to determine whether the
speech would be protected in any setting. If the court finds the speech to
be a "true threat," the speech can be restricted and no further analysis is
necessary. If the court determines that the speech is not a "true threat,"
then the court should determine if the speech would be protected in the
unique school setting. In that case, a school can only restrict the speech if
the speech itself causes, or reasonably has the potential to cause, a
material or substantial disruption of the school or if the speech meets one
of the two exceptions set forth in Fraser and Hazelwood.
In LaVine, the Ninth Circuit departed from these established doctrines
for evaluating student speech. By applying Tinker, the LaVine court not
only failed to make the basic determination that the poem was otherwise
protected, but also failed to evaluate "Last Words" as what the school
interpreted it to be-an implied threat to do harm. By applying the
Tinker doctrine to a case that had nothing to do with the potential effect
of the speech on other students, the court attempted to put a round peg in
a square hole. This attempt to fit a decision based on a fear of potential
action into the standard for evaluating the disruptive effect of speech
distorts the Tinker doctrine. Perhaps the choice to apply Tinker, with its
lower protection for student speech, was an attempt by the La Vine court
to reach the result of finding James's expulsion to be justified. While
there may be valid reasons for a school to take action to expel a student
whom school officials believe might pose a danger to the safety of the
school, these concerns should not become part of First Amendment
doctrine. The Tinker doctrine, a tool developed for evaluating First
Amendment protection, should remain focused on the actual or potential
effect of the student speech in question. Fear of potential future action
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that is not a direct result of the speech has no place in determining the
constitutional protection afforded student speech.
